Abstract
I. Introduction
US Military operations in the post-Cold War era have been punctuated by a twofold desire for casualty avoidance. The first manifestation of this desire is a longstanding feature associated with the conduct of war: the preservation of friendly forces. The success of Operation Desert Storm proved that heavy casualties on one's own forces are not requisite for military victory, and not surprisingly, indirectly promoted force protection as paramount in subsequent operations. In contrast, the other manifestation of casualty avoidance is the reduction of noncombatant losses. Of course, the term encompasses noncombatants from both one's own country as well as those residing in or belonging to the enemy state.
Although the idea of noncombatant immunity has a lengthy history traceable through the earliest warrior codes, the reduction of noncombatant casualties, particularly those of the enemy, has consistently been overshadowed by claims of military necessity. Arguably, the rise of the modern media, virtually omnipresent, might be credited with helping to renew interest in the protection of noncombatants since no aspect of conflict now escapes international scrutiny.
Complicating matters is the military's current focus on effects-based targeting and operations perhaps epitomized in the Air Force's doctrine regarding strategic attack. Rather than engaging enemy forces directly, current doctrine holds that strategic attack is used to destroy the enemy's centers of gravity (COGs), i.e. "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." 1 The idea is usually attributed to the initial architect of the Gulf War's air campaign Colonel John Warden, who proposed the existence of five rings or COGs, the most important being leadership, followed by organic essentials, infrastructure, population and finally the actual fighting mechanism, which is the least important. 2 However, the COG concept is certainly reminiscent of Sun Tzu's dicta purporting that the acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting since capturing forces is preferable to fighting. Hence, attacking the enemy's strategy, not troops, is ultimately what ensures success. 3 However, the nature of COGs has an inherent opacity regarding the combatant/noncombatant distinction (exempting of course Warden's last COG). Soldiers and civilians are now inextricably woven together in an amorphous battle space-the age of segregated battlefields has all but vanished.
The obvious problem is which notion, force protection or noncombatant immunity, ought to have priority and to what extent. Intuition, as well as the current modus operandi of the military, might suggest that it is more important for the military leader to preserve the lives of his soldiers even at the cost of greatly increasing the risk to noncombatants, especially when the noncombatant lives in question are not US citizens or allies but rather belong to the enemy state. After all, the prevailing view is that American lives are somehow more important. However, I will argue that such a notion is misguided. A military commander is morally obligated to do as much as he can to preserve the lives of all noncombatants even if significantly increasing the risk to his own soldiers. This does not necessitate fighting a war devoid of noncombatant casualties-that may well be virtually impossible-nor does it entail winning to be unachievable. Wars can still be fought and won;
however, the moral import of noncombatant immunity demands a shift in the current conception of force protection, and I will suggest what such a shift entails. 8 Thus, the commander's duty to ensure that no harm ever comes to his soldiers in combat is of tremendous pragmatic import but fails to establish itself as a stringent moral obligation.
II. Force Protection
Ultimately, mission must come first, and the safety of each individual soldier second.
III. Noncombatant Immunity
The argument for noncombatant immunity is grounded upon the idea that people possess certain basic rights stemming from their autonomy and moral agency. Exactly what rights belong to this set is debatable but certainly life and liberty are among them if they exist at all. I will limit my discussion to the former, which might be noted, is not a single claim in itself but is rather a cluster-right containing rights, privileges, certain immunities and claims to noninterference. 9 As such, the right to life is inalienable only in the sense that "others lack the power to make one cease to have it, and thus for one to have immunity against others in respect of it." 10 It follows then that all moral agents possess the inalienable right to life, regardless of whether they are citizens of the United States or the enemy state. However, inalienability with regard to the right to life does not extend to the stronger interpretation of inalienability holding that a person cannot make himself cease to have the right by any means at all. 11 This is not the case since combatants voluntarily give up at least a part of their right to life-the right not to be killed by other combatants-in order to gain the right to kill. In doing so, the combatant's right to life is no longer stringent. In contrast, noncombatants do not participate in any such exchange, and their right to life remains inalienable and stringent. Given this difference, the noncombatant is not subject to direct attack, being targeted or intentionally harmed by combatants.
Intuition seems to readily support this argument in the consideration of noncombatants considered friendly. 12 US soldiers cannot reasonably believe that they would have the liberty to kill US civilians during a mission, because such action was militarily "necessary." After all, their mission is to protect these people, even when only indirectly.
Military personnel realize that this is why they are fighting in the first place as evidenced by
Selfless Service as one of their core professional values.
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Unfortunately, intuition is not as trustworthy with regard to noncombatants considered "enemy." Though these people are not a direct threat to the combatant, their relationship with enemy combatants is seemingly pernicious. However, it is difficult to see how the contingent matter of nationality or spacio-temporal disposition has moral import. It is untenable to hold that US citizens enjoy moral superiority over foreigners simply in virtue of the fact that they are American. Any such presumption of moral superiority is groundless.
Noncombatants of all nationalities, friendly or enemy, enjoy the same inalienable right to life, which carries the same stringency regarding noninterference.
Hence, a combatant is obligated to respect the rights of all noncombatants entailing that they are morally obligated to respect the stringency of their right to life and must never intend to harm them or use them solely as a means to an end. 14 This obligation is particularly poignant for US soldiers. The values they fight for are not simply constrained or applicable to their own citizens but are liberal democratic ideals that apply to all people. The Constitution rests on this very premise. So, any war involving the US ultimately centers on the advancement on such ideals; any fight for the US against a state that is not well-ordered is a fight for basic rights-including the right to life-for not only their own citizens but those of the enemy state as well. 15 This is why humanitarian interests are overtly included in the National Security Strategy. 16 Hence, it follows that it is contradictory to then cause harm to the very people whose right to life you are obligated to protect.
Some might object to my claim on the grounds that enemy noncombatants are, after all, the enemy. However, such a notion fails to delineate the moral differences between those who prosecute a war and those who only witness it. This is not to say they bear no responsibility for the war, especially when they have the freedoms to influence such decisions as in the case of a democracy. Even so, this hardly constitutes grounds for the cessation of their noncombatant immunity. They are not the threat and cannot be considered legitimate targets.
I would be remiss to bypass the acknowledgment of the fact that the broad category of noncombatants can and ought to be further sub-divided, since the picture is not as black and white as I have perhaps implied. My comments regarding noncombatants are in fact meant to apply to innocent noncombatants, those with no direct involvement with fighting the war or materially supporting the war effort. Non-innocent noncombatants, on the other hand, are those people who, though not engaged in making war, directly support the war effort, the paradigmatic example being workers at munitions or armament factories. In virtue of their activity, non-innocent noncombatants have a less stringent claim not to be killed though they still cannot be directly targeted. In other words, bombing the munitions factory with the minimal number of workers present is much less controversial than inflicting the same number of casualties on innocents who are not engaged in a war-supporting activity.
The non-innocent noncombatants killed increased their own risk by engaging in an enterprise solely designed for the purpose of war. 17 Even so, such fine grain distinctions are not critical to my thesis as I submit that in any modern conflict there will be innocent non-combatants, and it is on them that I wish to focus. 18 Thus, noncombatants enjoy a more stringent right to life than combatants since they themselves have not opted to reduce or degrade it in any way, and no one else has that power.
Returning to the initial issue of whether a commander must give priority to force protection or to the safety of noncombatants the answer should be obvious. The stringency of the latter trumps the former morally obligating the commander. Ultimately, force protection at the expense of noncombatant safety is immoral and contradictory to the achievement of any legitimate end.
IV. The Doctrine of Double Effect and COGs
The aforementioned argument hardly resolves the issue. Knowing that noncombatant immunity is more important than force protection does not provide a normative framework for the commander attempting to win while waging a moral war. The unfortunate fact is that in war innocent noncombatants will die, and commanders cannot reasonably prevent all such (1) Legitimacy: the act is good in itself-i.e. it is a legitimate act of war.
(2) Effect: the direct effect is morally acceptable. (3) Intent: the intention of the actor is good, that is he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself. (4) Proportionality: the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect. 19 In the case of the unfortunate Frenchman, all tenets are easily satisfied: the attack was a legitimate act of war; it had an acceptable direct effect in that it killed or removed the German combatants from the area; the intent of the allies was good in that the death of the Frenchman was not used to facilitate mission success; and finally, the good coming from the invasion far outweighed the evil coming from the Frenchman's death. Hence, the action, which killed the French innocent noncombatant, appears to be justified.
Since the efficacy of DDE rests upon the third and fourth tenets, which carry the burden of the argument, I wish to mention some problems with them before relating DDE to the current strategy involving the strategic attack of centers of gravity. 20 Though DDE offers progress over less restrictive measures, the third and fourth tenets are problematically vague.
The intentions of a commander are not epistemologically accessible. Furthermore, the requirement to minimize evil and accept costs suffers from the same problem as proportionality, namely subjectivity in the assignment of relative values to military advantage, risk and noncombatant injury. 21 The issue is much like the Sorites paradox; large amounts, in this case of injuries to noncombatants, are easily recognized but no cut-off as to what constitutes a "large amount" seems identifiable.
In difficult cases, like those commonly arising from effects-based targeting against COGs, the benefit of the doubt concerning the vagueness rests with the opinion of the reasonable military commander. Consider the case of degrading an enemy Command, Control and Communications (C 3 ) network. In Kosovo, degrading this COG included the strategic bombing and destruction of the RTS, the state run broadcasting corporation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which resulted in the deaths of 10 to 17 civilians (the Serbians claimed 16). 22 23 Was this justified by DDE? Assuming the first two tenets to be satisfied, one must ask whether this meets intent and proportionality?
With regard to intent, NATO expressed two reasons for the attack. First, the station was alleged to have a dual use, because it supported radio relay for the FRY military and special police forces. Second, NATO declared that it needed "to strike at the very central nerve system of Milosovic's regime" and that strikes against targets such as the RTS were "a part of the campaign to dismantle the propaganda machinery which [was] a vital part of President Milosovic's control mechanism." 24 Neither reason evidences an overtly evil intent, though the Serbians argued that the act was simply a suppression of free speech and the truth, nor do they suggest that the civilians were used as a means. 25 However, there is some debate as to whether risk was minimized because of the possible inadequacy of warnings about the attack. Furthermore, proportionality is also suspect since the broadcasting at the facility "allegedly recommenced within hours of the strike" obviating any potential gain. 26 NATO responded to these criticisms by arguing that appropriate warnings were given prior to the attack, and regarding proportionality, a C 3 system is a complex web that cannot be disabled by a single strike, which entails that proportionality is to be measured as a totality of effects on the system rather than in terms of each discrete event. 27 My concern is that such an interpretation of DDE by the reasonable commander apparently justifies this attack and others like it. This supposed justification is strengthened by a similar decision by the UN's committee charged with reviewing the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, consider the following hypothetical scenario-that the same target was destroyed with the same results but by a ground combat unit rather than a missile strike. In such a case, DDE seems far less permissive. After all, the commander would have had many options to reduce risk to the civilians such as clearing the building of its occupants prior to employing his destructive capabilities. Since he did not do this, he failed to satisfy the final demand of the third tenet, and ends up with an unacceptable ratio of civilian death to gain, which fails the fourth tenet as well.
The fact that the moral judgments differ is rather problematic given the fact that both scenarios have identical missions and identical results. It cannot be the case that the use of aerospace power in a strategic attack capacity somehow requires less moral stringency or less moral forethought than the use of force by troops on the ground. Any such notion is wholly untenable. In actuality, the apparent disparity results not from difference in kind between air power and other force, but from the aforementioned vagueness of DDE, which is then exploited by the way the current doctrine mandating effects-based strategic attack of COGs is employed.
From its inception, strategic attack has been a way to degrade the enemy while reducing risk to the overall force. Aerospace power is the primary means for strategic attack, and it has proved effective and efficient. This is not to say that pilots conducting combat missions do not incur significant risk. They do, and they routinely act with heroism and valor. However, the aerospace force currently enjoys tremendous advantages because of the absolutely dominating technological sophistication involved. Ground forces, on the other hand, lack such a distinct advantage and hence face greater risks-US actions in Somalia speak to this point. For US forces, fighting the ground portion of a campaign is simply more dangerous and riskier for many more soldiers across the force. It would be ludicrous to believe that a ground invasion of Kosovo would have been casualty free if the Serbs had any resistance whatsoever. While air-centric strategic bombing of COGs is effective in breaking the enemy's will, it also is the safest way to wage a war at least with regard to friendly forces.
Though effective and efficient, the use of such strategic attack inevitably involves a moral cost-exposing noncombatants to unnecessary risk and harm. Such a claim raises an immediate objection, namely that during strategic attack noncombatants are exposed to less overall risk and harm since the use of ground forces would ultimately lead to more casualties, which prevents the latter from being the most moral course. The objection is a consequentialist approach based in the contention that the rightness of an action is dependent upon its ability to maximally obtain the good or end. 28 In the case of war, the good seems to be preserving lives, which then relegates the use of ground forces to a less desirable position as a moral option assuming it does indeed result in more casualties. Such consequentialist thinking was clearly evident in NATO's response regarding the issue of proportionality in the RTS bombing.
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The consequentialist argument, though, is plagued by a significant problem-it relies on moral luck. In other words, a moral agent's action is justified only in the cases where the outcome does in fact obtain. However, an agent's action will always lack sufficiency to actually bring about the desired end. Moral justification for the consequentialist is always contingent upon factors well beyond the actual span of the agent's control. Admittedly, I am guilty of oversimplifying consequentialism, which in reality has a rather robust philosophic tradition. However, a thorough exploration is not required for my purposes here since none of its variants provide the desired sufficiency regarding action and outcome.
Consider the following example. George sees a man desperately trying to fix a flat tire on his van along the roadside. Feeling helpful, George lends him assistance. The man is soon on his way because of George's aid, and he thanks George noting that he will now be able to make it to a very important engagement that evening. George believes that he has Returning to the issue at hand, the fact that a ground option might incur more overall casualties than the use of aerospace power says nothing definitive about its rightness or wrongness. Intent has much more relevance to the rightness of an act than how things actually turned out; morality is concerned with how one ought to act rather than actualities such as what one does or might do given Gyges' ring. 30 Thus, what has to be examined in the consideration of the use of strategic bombing to affect COGs as opposed to a ground force option is not simply proportionality but also intent, which is embodied in the third tenet of DDE.
Current practice acknowledges that attacking targets affecting COGs requires the assessments of the possible collateral damage to be made so as to establish proportionality and hence justification. However, if the resultant collateral damage is to also satisfy the third tenet of DDE, then it must be unintended. The exercise has become a rather litigious one as high-ranking commanders find themselves surrounded not only by strategists, tacticians and intelligence officers but by legal counsel as well. This occurred with the RTS station attack.
Here, NATO contended that it was never the intent to kill the workers or use them as a way of achieving the destruction of the station; hence, the casualties ought to be considered unintended. Assuming the number was not unacceptably high, the act is then deemed proportional, which completes its justification.
I contend that such a move is actually an equivocation of sorts regarding the notion of unintended casualties. Unintended implies accidental not simply unfortunate. If a casualty is foreseen as a result of an action, it is difficult to consider that casualty unintended. Good intent is much more than a person uttering a reassuring explanation after the fact-that is why integrity is a virtue. Consider the deaths at Hiroshima. It is difficult to say that these deaths were accidental. 31 They were foreseen, at least a large number of them, even though the people involved were not the actual objective but an unfortunate side effect. Such deaths are often still categorized as unintended by the reasonable commander. However, there is a significant difference for example between planning to destroy a vacant bridge but having a car with innocent noncombatants unexpectedly cross it at the hit time and planning to destroy the same bridge with the knowledge that the same car will be on it. Therein lies a problem:
foreseen deaths are not in fact unintended but are knowingly caused and accepted to obtain some end. "It is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the means you take to your chosen end." 32 An objection might be raised contending that the workers in the RTS were actually non-innocent noncombatants if they were in fact engaged in direct military support.
Assuming this to be the case, I would concede that the implications of equivocation in this case are diminished since the deaths of non-innocents can be of the foreseeable variety. After all, they have less stringency in their claim not to be attacked because of their chosen enterprise. Though my attack on the particular example may have been parried, the overall criticism remains: air-centric strategic attack of COGs often has foreseeable effects upon innocent noncombatants. For example, suppose the power grid of a city was targeted. The object of the attack, military related activities powered by the plant, would be affected but so would the everything else drawing power from the source including such things as hospitals, refrigeration, water purification processes and a whole host of others. The effects of such an attack are foreseen and cannot then be imagined to be accidental when they do occur.
When such actions have foreseeable negative effects to innocents, the moral burden falls upon the combatant to ensure that he minimizes them at the cost of increasing the risk to himself and his forces. This is in essence what the third tenet of DDE requires. However, the "minimization" usually manifests itself in the requirement to use precision-guided munitions with smaller effects as opposed to using more indiscriminant and destructive conventional ones. Such a move is hardly sufficient. If the objective is really valuable to the military campaign and the war is really worth winning, then the achievement of the objective must be worth the loss of soldiers' lives. This does not mean that soldiers have to or even ought to die. What it does mean is that combatants must be the ones bearing the risk of dying rather than the innocent noncombatants. This cannot be accomplished by simply using precision munitions. Though they may reduce damage in contrast to conventional ones, they serve only to reduce risk within the discrete categories of noncombatant and combatant but do nothing to affect the transfer of risk from the former to the latter as morality demands. Such a requirement makes fighting the war much more difficult than the efficient and effective option provided by aerospace power. Combatant's lives, perhaps many, will be lost, yet to
give force protection priority is exactly what cannot be done. The terrorist's response would be that his seemingly evil methods, though drastic, are in fact justified, because they are the only ones available in the given situation. However, such a claim is unacceptable. A good cause does not justify any possible method used to achieve it. A murderer is no less of a murderer just because he kills evil people in his attempt to improve society. Even if successful, there ought not be any gain in moral legitimacythough anomalies do occur like Yasser Arafat who rose from terrorist to Nobel Peace Prize recipient. The fact is that other means are always available. These alternatives will most likely expose the terrorist to a much greater risk and possibly jeopardize his ability to obtain his end, but they are available; terrorism is not the only recourse as he claims. The difficulty is that the terrorist is unwilling to assume risk and instead transfers it to the innocents.
Certainly it is easier for the terrorist to destroy a school bus full of children in contrast to attacking a military installation.
Interestingly enough, the moral condemnation that applies to the terrorist differs only in degree, not kind, from the position I have advanced regarding the current practice of involving foreseeable deaths. The analogy is loose as the terrorist's position is complicated by other factors such as his exploitation of the combatant/noncombatant distinction and failing to meet the jus ad bellum requirements for engaging in hostilities in the first place.
However, breaking the will of an enemy through strategic attack has no more moral legitimacy than terrorism if it capitalizes on the innocent.
IV. Implications
Fighting justly as contended does not necessitate the end of aerospace power or the use of air-centric strategic attack-though staunch advocates of Douhet and LeMay might disagree. Aerospace power in itself is not immoral and in fact is essential for success in wars and conflicts of the future, which will not be won without the joint employment and application of forces. If the US is to fight these future conflicts justly, morality requires a shift in our current conception and practices regarding force protection.
Politicians and military leaders alike must abandon the zero-casualty mentality and de-emphasize force protection at the cost of increased risk to noncombatants. Friendly casualty estimates are important planning factors, but they ought never to drive policy and strategy; national interests should. The current strategy of shaping the international environment and responding to threats involves a myriad of national interests that must be closely scrutinized to determine which among them are really worth the lives of American soldiers. When a conflict arises over a particular interest that lacks such import, cruise missile strikes, though convenient, are not morally viable if they will harm the innocent.
Such policy ought to give way to nonmilitary instruments of power even if less efficient. Of course, the decision to refrain from military force reference a particular issue does not need to be advertised so as not to degrade US diplomatic leverage.
Those interests worth the aforementioned costs obligate leaders and policy makers to act decisively and at the same time to inform the American people as to the importance of obtaining the said interests. In this age of asymmetric warfare, enemies will prey upon the ability to break the national will by exploiting the current sentiments relating to casualty aversion regarding friendly forces-much like the effect in Somalia after US casualties.
Predicating support for military operations on the pretense of casualty free operations only serves to encourage such a strategy. However, the recognition of a proper military ethic, which demands selflessness and integrity as outlined above, surmounts that threat.
Professional soldiers are not afraid to fight when called upon, even when the danger is of the gravest sort. Military setbacks are only ruinous to campaign strategy when the interests are not worth fighting and dying for in the first place. When the interests have the requisite import, the loss of some soldiers ought to only strengthen US resolve, at home as well as in the theater of operation, rather than weaken it. The general population is not so casualty averse so as to denounce any operation involving US losses-witness the overwhelming support of the Gulf War despite substantial casualty predictions.
Upon recognizing the disparity of the moral status of innocent noncombatants in contrast with combatants, leaders are also obligated to consider and employ the full array of forces capable of accomplishing a given mission. In doing so, their determination of what forces to use must not rest upon expediency and efficiency but upon balancing those needs with the moral requirement to reduce risk to innocents. Unfortunately, aerospace power in isolation does not provide the capabilities to adequately satisfy the claims of morality with regard to reducing risk to innocents, at least not yet. When technology advances to the point that munitions have the same powers of discrimination as a soldier on the ground, aerospace power may well be sufficient. Until that time, policy makers and strategists cannot continue to believe in light of just war theory that aerospace power alone is a viable option; rather, jointly packaged forces from all services must be employed even when it entails more risk and associated costs.
Leaders must also realize that not every center of gravity, critical capability or critical requirement translates into a strategic target, even if its destruction facilitates the war effort.
For those that do, the considerations of targeting and weaponry must extend beyond the realm of aerospace platforms. The use of ground forces and the associated effects must be similarly weighed when considering strategic targets. In essence, the doctrine of strategic attack must become more robust and inclusive of other services else it will always be in jeopardy of moral inadequacy. Though riskier in the force protection sense than using precision guided munitions, the use of special operations or air assault forces might present significantly less risk to innocents in certain strategic attack situations with foreseen collateral damage, and hence be the morally preferable choice. In other words, leaders must realize that legal sufficiency does not necessitate moral goodness.
It is not clear that philosophers can develop more restrictive or definitive rules and principles than Walzer's DDE regarding conduct in war. Too often, one looks for a prescriptive methodology regarding morality that promises to delineate day from night in the moral twilight. Such efforts are self-defeating; morality is not an exact science. What is required is not more prescription but leaders imbued with the virtues established in the professional military ethic. Properly developed notions of the core values, particularly selfless service and integrity, are what will clarify the gray areas and guide the combatant's conduct. 33 Integrity demands not the obtaining of an end, but the rightness of the means.
Integrity thus precludes foreseeable deaths as accidental and unintended, because it demands right action regardless of the consequences involved. Integrity also entails selflessness in soldiers since fulfilling their moral obligations inherently shifts risk onto themselves. Such
